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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN 
OF 
THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE 
T. MORRIS OSTLER TO 
A REAL ESTATE BROKER 
ACT AS 
Case No. 
Priority-
94-
No. 
-0713-
14 
-CA 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
This Petition for judicial review of a final agency action 
is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals and said 
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals by Utah 
Code Annotated, §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues for review in this Petition, and their 
accompanying standards of review, are as follows: 
1. Whether or not the Division of Real Estate erred in 
finding that Petitioner had induced Gidalthi O. Ojeda D (herein 
"Buyer") to request reimbursement of earnest money through 
dishonesty. 
2. Whether or not the Division of Real Estate violated 
prior practice in revoking Petitioner's real estate license. 
The standard of review for findings of fact is set forth in 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16(4)(g). The statute requires that 
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an agency's findings will be affirmed "only if they are supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n., 858 P.2d 
1381, 1385 (Utah 1983); Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Div., 
842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1992); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n., 842 
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992); Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of 
Emp. Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 18 (1993), cert, denied, -P.2d- (Utah 
1994) . 
The standard of review in challenging an agency's action for 
being contrary to prior practice is set out in Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). The statute requires that the 
Court review whether the agency's action is contrary to the 
agency's prior practice and whether the inconsistency has a fair 
and rational basis. SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Auditing Div., 849 
P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993); B.J. Titan Servs. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 822, 831 (Utah 1992); Pickett v. Utah Dep't of 
Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statute is dispositive of the issues herein: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
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(iii) contrary to the agency's 
prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the revocation of Petitioner's license to 
operate as a real estate broker by the Utah Division of Real 
Estate. The Utah Division of Real Estate revoked Petitioner's 
license as a result of Petitioner's violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §61-2-11. 
Appellant alleges that the Divisions revocation of his real 
estate license was improper. The Division's decision to revoke 
was based upon a finding that Petitioner had dishonestly induced 
a buyer to make statements to Petitioner's former employer that a 
closing had not taken place on a particular piece of property, 
when in fact it had, in order to recover $500.00. Appellant 
asserts that this finding by the Division was improper and not 
properly supported by the record. 
In addition, appellant alleges that the decision of the Utah 
Division of Real Estate to revoke his license for his violation 
of U.C.A. §61-2-11 ran contrary to the previous practice of the 
Division in dealing with similar matters. The Division of Real 
Estate's treatment of Petitioner, therefore, was unreasonable, 
unfair and prejudicial to Petitioner. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter was initial heard by Administrative Law Judge, 
J. Steven Eklund before the Division of Real Estate of the 
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah and acted upon by the 
Utah Real Estate Commission. Subsequently, at Petitioner's 
request, this matter was subject to an agency review by the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah, Constance B. White. 
DISPOSITION BY AGENCY 
1. The Administrative Law Judge held that Petitioner had 
admitted to violating U.C.A. §61-2-11(6) by commingling funds of 
a seller with his own monies. The Judge also found that 
Petitioner admitted to violating U.C.A. §61-1-11(15) by operating 
as a real estate agent while his license was suspended and 
receiving a commission while his broker's license was inactive. 
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge held that Petitioner 
violated U.C.A. §61-2-11(17) by engaging in a dishonest dealing. 
More specifically, the Judge found that Petitioner encouraged a 
buyer to improperly seek a release of earnest money. The Judge 
recommended that as a result of the afore-mentioned violations 
Petitioner's real estate broker license be revoked. Said 
recommendation was confirmed and adopted by the Utah Real Estate 
Commission. 
Upon request of the Petitioner, the matter was reviewed by 
the Utah Department of Commerce. The Executive Director of the 
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Department, Constance B. White, found that the Division's 
decision was based on fact and entered according to law. The 
Division's decision, therefore, was upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant and material facts concerning the background 
and Appeal of this matter are as follows: 
1. Petitioner was licensed to practice as a real estate 
broker in Utah. He was initially licensed as a sales agent in 
1975. Petitioner became a licensed broker in October 1987 and he 
was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah County from at least 
November 198 9 to January 18, 1990. During that time, 
Petitioner's principal broker was Shane Luck. 
2. On November 28, 1989, Petitioner prepared an 
earnest money sales agreement, whereby Gidalthi O. Ojeda D 
offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and 
Alice Skankey. Petitioner received $500.00 earnest money, which 
he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust account. The 
Skankeys accepted the offer. Help-U-Sell was to be paid a fee 
totalling $2,450 on the sale of the home. Petitioner's 
commission, payable from that amount, would total $1,110.00. 
3. Help-U-Sell had full control of the $500.00 
earnest money deposited in its trust account and ultimately 
delivered the same back to the Skankeys. The Petitioner tendered 
the balance of Help-U-Sell's commission to Help-U-Sell, which 
tender was refused. 
4. Petitioner's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was 
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terminated on January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction 
was not closed as of that date. 
5. Prior to terminating Petitioner's affiliation with 
the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if Petitioner had 
any transactions which were still pending. At that time the 
Skankey-Ojeda transaction appeared as though it would not close. 
This information was given to Mr. Luck. 
6. Petitioner's license was inactivated January 18, 
1990 and remained in that status for approximately three (3) 
weeks. The license was then suspended for one (1) year, 
effective February 10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by the 
Commission (Case No. E89-06-10). 
7. On January 20, 1990 the Skankeys executed a 
warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the property to the Ojedas. 
On January 22, 1990 an all-inclusive trust deed was executed by 
the Ojedas and notarized by the Petitioner. The Administrative 
Law Judge found that the closing occurred on January 22, 1990, 
some four days after the Petitioner's license was inactivated. 
8. On or about February 16, 1990, Petitioner tendered 
an $840.00 check to Help-U-Sell. The February 16, 1990 check 
represented the selling fee which would have been retained by the 
brokerage less the earnest money still on deposit. By letter, 
dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck returned the closing documents 
to Petitioner, advised Petitioner that the Skankeys had been 
informed Petitioner would have the closing documents and informed 
Petitioner that the Skankeys wanted "their closing documents and 
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money immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent 
prorations with Ojeda." 
9. Help-U-Sell was unwilling to close this 
transaction. The Skankeys (sellers) and the Ojedas (buyers) were 
extremely anxious to cause the sale to go forward. In the 
absence of the sale the Skankeys believed they would be 
significantly damaged. Indeed, Dr. Skankey testified in his 
deposition conducted on Friday, June 4, 1993 at page 31, lines 12 
through 16: 
Q: So, Dr. Skankey, our question is, is 
that if you assume for a minute that the 
Ojeda sale didn't take place, and no one 
followed through on it, would that have 
been harmful to you? 
A: Yes. 
10. The Respondent disbursed all funds due the 
Skankeys (sellers) on February 16, 1990. Mr. Luck 
subsequently sent the earnest money deposit to the Skankeys. 
11. Neither the Skankeys nor the Ojedas suffered 
any damaged by reason of the Petitioner's action in closing 
this transaction. 
12. The Petitioner was motivated to close this 
sale as a result of his desire to assist both the Ojedas and 
the Skankeys in their desire to complete this transaction. 
13. In light of the determination by the 
Administrative Law Judge (J. Steven Eklund) that the closing 
occurred on January 22, 1990, four (4) days after the 
Petitioner's associate broker's license was inactivated, the 
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Petitioner could have re-activated his own principal 
broker's license, prior to the closing date, and completed 
this transaction. The transaction would have been no 
different had this license been reactivated, but rather, 
would have been consummated in the identical manner it was 
in fact consummated. 
14. The only person or entity claiming any damage 
in this matter is a claim by Mr. Luck on behalf of Help-U-
Sell for lost business. The broker's portion of the 
commission was either controlled by Help-U-Sell (in the form 
of the $500.00 Help-U-Sell earnest money deposit) or 
tendered to Help-U-Sell (in the form of a check in the 
amount of $840.00 delivered by Petitioner to Help-U-Sell). 
15. The recommended order as prepared by the 
Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner's license 
as a real estate broker be revoked. The Utah Real Estate 
Commission confirmed and adopted the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order as prepared by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
16. Petitioner has complied with all 
administrative remedies in attempting to rescind the Order. 
17. On November, 28, 1994 Petitioner filed with 
the Utah Court of Appeals a request for judicial review of 
the Division of Real Estate's decision to revoke his real 
estate license. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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The Division of Real Estate erred in finding that 
Petitioner had engaged in dishonest dealings. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner implicitly 
encouraged Buyer to improperly seek release of earnest money 
held by the Help-U-Sell brokerage. Said finding was 
improper inasmuch as it was not supported by substantial 
evidence within the record. 
The record demonstrates that Petitioner provided the 
Buyer with different options as to how to recover the 
earnest money from Help-U-Sale. One of the options 
presented by Petitioner was that Buyer could state to Help-
U-Sale that the Sale had not closed (it, in fact, had 
closed). This in no way signifies that Petitioner supported 
such an approach, nor encouraged it. Further, any 
additional testimony concerning Petitioner's conduct is 
hearsay and unreliable. 
The Division further erred in its decision to revoke 
Petitioner's real estate license since its decision runs 
contrary to prior practice of the Division in similar cases. 
The Division does not typically revoke a real estate 
broker's license for violations similar to those of 
Petitioner. This is particularly true when, as in 
Petitioner's case, substantial and numerous mitigating 
factors exist. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED 
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THAT PETITIONER HAD ENGAGED IN AND ENCOURAGED DISHONEST 
BEHAVIOR. 
The Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact 
concluded that, "Respondent...disingenuously and implicitly 
encouraged Mr. Ojeda to improperly seek the release of the 
earnest monies held by the brokerage." (Ruling, pg. 4). 
This finding was improper as it was not supported by the 
weight of the evidence contained in the record. Inasmuch as 
the Division's decision to revoke Petitioner's real estate 
license was strongly weighted by this conclusion, the Court 
should reinstate Petitioner's license. 
An order of an administrative agency may be challenged 
if the, "agency action is base upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the Court." U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4)(g). The 
record in this matter, therefore, must contain substantial 
evidence that Petitioner engaged in dishonest behavior. 
Substantial evidence is more than minor comments and 
hearsay testimony. Substantial evidence is, "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 
776 P.2d 63 (Ut App. 1989) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. 
Hunicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985). 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of 
evidence... though 'something less than the weight of the 
evidence.'" Id. 
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The Court should consider both the quantity and quality 
of the evidence pointing to the finding of facts in question 
in order to determine if they can properly be supported. In 
the present case, neither the quantity nor the quality of 
the evidence supports a finding by the Administrative Law 
Judge that the Petitioner had conducted himself dishonestly. 
Evidence, in the record, of Petitioner's alleged 
dishonesty is limited to the testimony of two individuals: 
1) the Petitioner; and 2) Shane Luck. 
Petitioner's testimony regarding his alleged dishonesty 
is set forth in the hearing transcript at follows (see 
Hearing Transcript pgs. 41-45): 
Q. Now, Mr. Ojeda came to Shane Luck and tried 
to collect his $500? 
A. I said: "If you want to have credit for that 
in your closing, somebody has got to happen there. And if 
in fact we close it through Help-U-Sell, fine, they keep the 
$500. If you close at other places, if Help-U-Sale doesn't 
close it, frankly, it should go somewhere else. If Help-U-
Sell doesn't want anything to do with this transaction, then 
it shouldn't come out of their place." 
Q. Sure. But Mr. Ojeda attempted to go to Mr. 
Luck to collect the $500 earnest money. Now--
A. That's because I gave him some options. I 
said: "You can do this and this and this." And that's one 
of the options that he had. 
Q. You told Mr. Ojeda he could go in and try to 
collect the $500 from Help-U-Sell? 
A. I said that was an option. 
Q. Well, isn't the only way that he would be 
able to collect the $500 is if the deal had in fact not 
closed? 
A. Essentially so. Of course, if it had not 
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closed through Help-U-Sell, he could have collected--
supposedly collected that. If Help-U-Sell was going to 
close it, then I wanted Help-U-Sell to close it. 
Q. So you told Mr. Ojeda to instruct Mr. Luck 
that -- tell Mr. Luck that the deal had not closed, had 
failed, and to return the $500 to the Ojedas, right? 
A. Well that was an option, Paul. Like I said, 
I said: "You could close it. you don't have t close it. 
And you can do what you want. If you are not going to close 
it, then you ought to get your $500 back." 
Q. Okay. So you told them to tell Mr. Luck that 
the deal had not closed, correct? 
A. Well, at that point, it had not closed. 
Q. The deal had not closed? 
A. The transaction had not closed. When I say 
"closing," the closing doesn't take place until its funded. 
Q. But the -- you filled out a trust deed. They 
paid you -- they paid a down -- the Ojedas had paid a down 
payment, correct ? 
A. They had. 
Q. And you had paid sent that money to the 
A. The money had not been sent, no. 
* * * 
Q. So this deal was, in fact, on the railroad 
track, if you will? 
A. It was moving towards closure. 
Q. It was moving towards closure? 
A* That's correct. 
Q. yet you told Mr. Ojeda that he could tell the 
broker, Shane Luck, that the deal had not closed and --
correct? 
A. Well, you ~-
Q. Let me rephrase it. 
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A. Okay. 
Q. You told him that he had the option to tell 
the --
A. I can't tell him what to say. 
Q. You told Mr. Ojeda he had the option to tell 
Mr. Luck the deal had not closed? 
A. That's correct. I let him make his own 
decision there. 
Q. But you utilized your expertise in these 
areas and shared the that expertise with the Ojedas, 
correct? 
A. I felt like if he wanted credit for that $500 
earnest money then he had to get that credit, whatever he 
wanted to do. 
Q. So you utilized your expertise to educate the 
Ojedas on how to obtain the $500 that they would then pay 
you for the commission, right? 
A. Well, you're trying to structure something 
here that isn't quite right. I said, "This is" -- "This is 
your options, Mr. Ojeda: If you want to use that for your 
credit, that's fine. If you don't, leave it alone. 
Shane Luck's testimony regarding Petitioner's alleged 
dishonesty is set forth in the trial transcript as follows 
(Hearing Transcript, pgs. 68-70): 
Q. Mr. Luck, did one of the Ojedas come into your 
office in 19 -- probably, February of 1990. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did this --
MR. SEILER: Your Honor, I recognize that the 
rules are relaxed, but I would object to the basic hearsay. 
It's just to get it on the record. 
THE COURT: That's understood and noted. Go 
ahead Mr. Grant. 
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MR. GRANT: And did this individual request 
that the earnest money agreement --or the earnest money 
deposit be returned to him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why did He request that the money be returned 
to him? 
A. He said that the sale had failed. It was not 
closing and he wanted his earnest money back. 
Q. Did you have a question -- did you have an 
opportunity to question him further regarding this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you learn from your questioning? 
A. We had an active file and I knew there were 
problems with closing it. I did not know that it had closed 
at that stage. I pursued that with him and asked him what 
was happening. He was quite nervous, and probably 15 
minutes into the conversation, he finally said, "Well, 
Morris asked me to come and get the earnest money because we 
had closed the transaction." 
Q. But he earlier had told you that the deal had, in 
fact, not closed? 
A. That's right and he admitted to lying to me. 
Q. He admitted to lying to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he tell you that Morris had instructed him to 
lie to you? 
A. I don't recall at that conversation. I know that 
he said to me that Morris asked me to com and get the 
earnest money. 
Q. Do you recall if he told you that -- that Morris 
instructed you that -- that Morris instructed him to tell 
you that the deal had not closed? 
A. That's right, he did say that. 
Q. So then, in fact--
A. I didn't know it was a lie at that point but he 
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told me that. 
Q. But since the deal had not -- was, in fact, had 
closed and since -- and, in fact, that Morris had asked Mr. 
Ojeda to tell you that it had failed to close, it was a lie, 
right? 
A. I believe (Inaudible), yes. 
The Petitioners testimony at the hearing clearly 
demonstrates that he made no overt effort to deceive Mr. 
Luck or Help-U-Sell. Petitioner's comments to Mr. Ojeda 
were strictly a list of options available to Mr. Ojeda which 
he could choose to follow or ignore. The record makes no 
reference that Petitioner gave any instruction to Mr. Ojeda 
as to which option was best nor does it suggest Petitioner 
encourage him to deceive Mr. Luck or Help-U-Sale. 
Included in Petitioner's options was Mr. Ojeda 
informing Help-U-Sell the deal had not closed in order to 
recover their earnest money. Petitioner felt this option 
was reasonable for a number of reasons. The sale had, in 
fact, not been completed. Also, Help-U-Sell, and Mr. Luck, 
refused to assist the parties in closing the real estate 
transaction. 
The testimony of Shane Luck, with regard to 
Petitioner's encouragement to Mr. Ojeda to recover the 
earnest money by deceit, should be disregarded as it is 
entirely based upon hearsay. Rule 802, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The testimony of Mr. Luck is untrustworthy 
inasmuch as the individual who initially alleged 
Petitioner's dishonesty, Mr. Ojeda, did not assert said 
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allegations under oath. Likewise, Petitioner was not 
afforded an opportunity to cross examine Mr. Ojeda with 
reference to his allegations. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 
198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957) State v. Lory, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986). The credibility of Mr. Luck's testimony concerning 
Petitioners's dishonesty is further diminished by the fact 
that Mr. Luck admits that Mr. Ojeda had lied to him 
immediately prior to alleging misconduct by Petitioner. 
(Hearing Transcript pg. 69) . 
The record contains no credible evidence that 
Petitioner has requested or encouraged Mr. Ojeda to lie to 
Mr. Luck. The lack of substantial evidence removes the 
possibility of the Administrative Law Judge, and 
subsequently the division, finding that Petitioner had 
engaged in dishonest behavior. 
The findings of the Commission, and subsequently the 
Department of Commerce, that Petitioner had engaged in 
dishonest behavior was the major factor in their decision 
revoke Petitioner's real estate broker's license. In her 
Order on Review, the Executive Director of the Department 
Commerce concluded as follows: 
[T]he Commission made a finding regarding the most 
egregious conduct leading to Petitioner's license 
revocation, the dishonest dealing resulting from 
his inducement of Mr. Ojeda to request 
reimbursement of earnest monies through dishonesty 
in violation of Utah Code §61-2-11(17). While 
Petitioner urges certain facts in mitigation of 
his conduct, none of them outweigh the gravity of 
this fact. I find the Commission properly 
considered all facts mitigating in Petitioner's 
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favor and all aggravating facts weighing against 
him. Consequently, the revocation order was based 
on fact and entered according to law (Order on 
Review pg. 3-4). 
The Commission's conclusion that Petitioner had engaged 
in dishonest conduct is not supported by substantial 
evidence within the record. 
Therefore, the Commission's and Department's decision 
to revoke Petitioner's real estate brokers license, 
primarily as a result of his alleged dishonest behavior, was 
without basis. This Court should, therefore, reinstate 
Petitioner's real estate broker's license. 
POINT II THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE'S DECISION TO 
REVOKE PETITIONER'S REAL ESTATE BROKER'S LICENSE WAS 
CONTRARY TO ITS PRIOR PRACTICE IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by the 
real estate Division's decision to revoke his real estate 
license because the Division's decision was inconsistent 
with prior decisions with facts and circumstances of a 
similar nature. This Court is entitled to provide relief 
if a petitioner is substantially prejudiced by an agency 
action which is "contrary to the agency's prior practice." 
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
Petitioner was found in violation of U.C.A. §61-2-11 
for closing a real estate transaction while his license was 
inactive commingling funds and engaging in dishonest 
behavior. Violations of a similar nature are typically 
punished by the Division Real Estate with either a fine, a 
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suspension of a license, or both. The revocation of 
Petitioner's Real Estate Brokers License, therefore, is 
excessive and clearly beyond the prior practice of the 
division. See, Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce 858 P.2d 
157 (Utah 1993). 
The Division of Real Estate's decision to revoke 
Petitioner's license is particularly excessive and contrary 
to prior practice considering the Divisions's improper 
finding that Petitioner had engaged in dishonest conduct. 
See, Point I, Supra. Properly considering only Petitioner's 
violations of U.C.A. §§61-2-11(6) and (15) the Division's 
decision to revoke Petitioner's license moves even further 
beyond the penalties typically ordered by the Division. 
This is particularly true considering the numerous 
mitigating circumstances in this matter. 
The mitigating circumstances of this case augment the 
excessiveness of the Division's penalties in comparison to 
previous decisions by the Division. Petitioner's motivation 
in closing the real estate transaction was that the buyers 
who were from Peru, would have no place to live. 
Furthermore, failure to close would have resulted in a 
negative cash flow for the Sellers of the property. In his 
testimony, Petitioner stated as follows (hearing Transcript 
pgs. 21-22) 
Q. How come you closed this deal after you were no 
longer licensed? 
A. Because I felt it was urgent enough to close. I 
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felt -- I felt really bad for both parties, the one that was 
anxious to buy, the one was anxious to sell. And, granted, 
in retrospect, I would have done it a different way. But it 
would have -- it would have hurt the buyers. They would 
have not had a place to live. They were in fact planning on 
getting moved in and so forth in part of the property. And, 
ultimately, it have probably hurt the sellers because it 
would have gone and been a detriment cash-wise for them. 
The record clearly demonstrates that both buyer and 
seller. Considered the closing on the property as critical. 
Neither buyer nor seller suffered any damaged as a result of 
any conduct or violation of Petitioner. 
Petitioner's assistance in the closing, although 
improper, was further prompted by the failure of the 
brokerage to close the transaction. The testimony of both 
Petitioner and Shane Luck demonstrates that the brokerage 
Help-U-Sell had no intention of closing the deal 
notwithstanding it had the $500.00 of earnest money. While 
the forementioned circumstances don't negate Petitioner's 
violations of U.C.A. §61-2-11 his motivation in proceeding 
with the closing certainly should be considered as 
mitigating factors when structuring an appropriate penalty. 
Considering the foregoing mitigating circumstances and the 
nature of the violations, the Division's decision to revoke 
Petitioner's license certainly exceeded customary penalties 
ordered by the Division in similar circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner 
respectfully moves this Court for an Order reversing the 
Division of Real Estate's decision that Petitioner had 
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engaged in dishonest behavior. Petitioner further requests 
that this Court find that the Utah Division of Real Estate 
exceeded its customary practice in revoking Petitioner's 
real estate broker's license considering the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully moves this Court 
for an Order reinstating Petitioner's real estate brokers 
license or, in the alternative, remanding this case back to 
the Utah Division of Real Estate for reconsideration in 
light of the Court's new findings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
THOMAS W./SEILER' ^ff. I 1 Q / 
A t t o r n e y / t o r P e t i t i o n e r /rpMfe> Us. J£\[{/ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, this 
24th day of April, 1995: 
Lynn Nicholas 
Utah Attorney General 
Consumer Rights Division 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 8411 
G \RIVERS\LITIGATI\OSTLER BRI 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
of T. Morris Ostler to Act as a : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Real Estate Broker : RE90-10-01 
Appearances: 
Thomas W. Seiler for Respondent 
Paul M. Grant for the Division of Real Estate 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
An April 18, 1994 hearing was conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of the Commerce. The parties initially 
submitted a stipulation of undisputed facts. Therefore, evidence was offered and received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review and action by the Real 
Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is presently licensed to practice as a real estate broker in Utah. He was 
initially licensed as a sales agent in 1975. Respondent became a licensed broker in October 1987 
and he was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah County from at least November 1989 to January 18, 
1990. During that time, Respondent's principal broker was Shane Luck. 
2. On November 28, 1989, Respondent prepared an earnest money sales agreement, whereby 
Gidalthi O. Ojeda D offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and Alice Skankey. 
Respondent received $500 earnest money, which he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust 
account The Skankeys accepted the offer. Help-U-Sell was to be paid a fee totalling $2,450 on the 
sale of the home. Respondent's commission, payable from that amount, would total $1,110. 
3. Respondent's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was terminated January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-
Skankey transaction had not closed as of that date. Prior to terminating Respondent's affiliation with 
the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if Respondent had any transactions which were still 
pending. Respondent stated no outstanding transactions existed. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction was 
scheduled to close on or about January 20, 1990. 
4. Respondent's license was inactivated January 18, 1990 and remained in that status for 
approximately three (3) weeks. The license was then suspended for one (1) year, effective February 
10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by the Commission (Case No. RE89-06-10). The suspension 
was prompted by Respondent's conviction for the possession of a forged document, relative to a real 
estate transaction. 
5. On January 20, 1990, the Skankeys executed a warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the 
property to the Ojedas. On January 22, 1990, an all-inclusive trust deed was executed by the Ojedas 
and notarized by Respondent The parties have stipulated the closing on the transaction occurred 
during February 1990. However, both the buyers and sellers statements reflect the taxes and 
mortgage interest payments were prorated as of January 22, 1990. Notwithstanding the parties' 
stipulation, the more substantial evidence establishes the closing occurred January 22, 1990. When 
Respondent closed the transaction, he knew his license was inactive and that the license would be 
suspended in the immediate future. 
6. Mr. Luck had informed Respondent not to close the transaction because the Skankeys had 
a non-assumable loan on the property and title insurance could not thus be obtained. Mr. Luck 
further declined to close the transaction through Help-U-Sell due to the existence of that loan, which 
included a due-on-sale clause, and Mr. Luck's belief the Ojedas did not understand the possibility the 
loan could be called due on the sale of the property. Moreover, Mr. Luck did not desire to expose 
Help-U-Sell to any liability under those circumstances. 
7. Mr. Luck was not aware Respondent had closed the transaction on January 22, 1990. 
Respondent received $1,950 at closing as the balance of the selling fee and he deposited those funds 
in his own checking account Respondent also received funds payable to the Skankeys and deposited 
those monies in his checking account Respondent told Mr. Ojeda that he (the latter) could inform 
Mr. Luck the transaction had failed to obtain the $500 earnest money still held in the Help-U-Sell 
trust account 
8. Prior to February 16, 1990, Mr. Ojeda contacted Mr. Luck and informed the latter that 
the transaction had failed. Mr. Ojeda thus requested the return of the earnest money deposit Mr. 
Luck made further inquiry and Mr. Ojeda then admitted the transaction had closed. Mr. Luck 
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requested all closing documents be delivered to Help-U-Sell. 
9. On or about February 16, 1990, Respondent tendered an $840 check to Help-U-Sell. The 
February 16, 1990 check represented the selling fee which would have been payable to the brokerage 
less the earnest money still on deposit By letter, dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck returned the 
closing documents to Respondent, advised Respondent that the Skankeys had been informed 
Respondent would have the closing documents and informed Respondent that the Skankeys wanted 
"their closing documents and money immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent prorations 
with Ojeda". 
10. Mr. Luck also informed Respondent that he assumed Respondent would provide "the 
appropriate documents concerning this transaction to the Ojedas". Mr. Luck further stated Help-U-
Sell would notify Respondent of "a fee due to us from you for the loss of business to us as a result 
of your actions". Based on the advice of legal counsel that the closing should remain Respondent's 
responsibility, Help-U-Sell did not accept the February 16, 1990 check. Respondent disbursed the 
funds due to the Skankeys on February 16, 1990 and Mr. Luck subsequently sent the earnest money 
deposit to the Skankeys. The Ojedas eventually defaulted on their purchase of the property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-2-11 provides a civil penalty not to exceed $500 may be imposed 
and a real estate license may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, 
whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of: 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any 
monies coming into his possession that belong to others, or 
commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those funds from 
the purpose for which they were received. 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission or 
the rules adopted by the commission and the division; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing. 
Section 61-2-1 provides it is unlawful for any person to act as a principal broker without a 
license. Section 61-2-2 further provides a principal broker's license is required to receive valuable 
consideration for negotiating or closing a sale of real estate. Moreover, Section 61-2-10 provides it 
is unlawful for any associate broker to accept a commission from any person except the principal 
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broker with whom he is affiliated and that an inactive licensee is not authorized to conduct real 
estate transactions. 
Respondent acknowledges he received funds owed to the Skankeys on the closing of the 
transaction, he deposited those funds into his personal account and thus commingled those funds with 
his own monies. Respondent closed the transaction January 22, 1990, but he failed to remit monies 
due to the Skankeys within a reasonable time after the closing of the transaction. Respondent thus 
violated Section 61-2-11(6) in both instances. 
Respondent also acknowledges he received a commission from the sale of the property when 
he was not affiliated with a principal broker and his license was inactive. Respondent paid himself a 
sales commission and fees for closing the transaction, although he was not licensed as a principal 
broker and was thus not entitled to receive consideration directly from the parties. Further, 
Respondent violated the order previously entered by the Commission when he disbursed funds from 
the closing of the transaction while his license was suspended by reason of that order. Respondent 
thus engaged in multiple instances of misconduct violative of Section 61-2-11(15). 
Respondent also suggested Mr. Ojeda erroneously inform Mr. Luck the transaction had closed 
as the means whereby Mr. Ojeda might obtain the earnest money held on deposit through the Help-
U-Sell brokerage. Respondent thus disingenuously and implicidy encouraged Mr. Ojeda to 
improperly seek the release of the earnest monies held by the brokerage. Given the foregoing, 
Respondent clearly engaged in dishonest dealing violative of Section 61-2-11(17). A proper factual 
and legal basis clearly exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's license. 
Respondent urges certain mitigating factors should be considered with regard to any 
disciplinary action taken on his license. Specifically, Respondent contends the Ojedas and the 
Skankeys were highly motivated to close the transaction because the Ojedas would have no place to 
live and the Skankeys would incur a negative cash flow if the transacation did not close. Respondent 
also asserts neither party suffered any damage because the transaction was closed, the brokerage 
unreasonably refused to close the transaction and Respondent merely desired to assist the Ojedas and 
the Skankeys as to promote their interests. 
The parties to this transaction obviously desired a sale be completed. It is unclear from this 
record whether either party suffered any damage by reason of Respondent's unilateral decision to 
close the transaction without the knowledge of and participation by his brokerage. There is no 
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sufficient evidence to find and conclude either the Ojedas or the Skankeys did not understand the 
significance of the non-assumable loan or the existence of the due-on-sale clause. Respondent may 
have been somewhat motivated by his desire to assist both the Ojedas and the Skankeys in their 
desire to complete this transaction. 
However, various aggravating factors exist as to Respondent's misconduct The Court finds 
and concludes Respondent expended substantial efforts to realize the sale of the property, prompt the 
closing of this transaction and that he thus anticipated receiving compensation for those efforts. 
Significantly, Respondent ignored the consequences of his licensure status as he proceeded to close 
the transaction when his license was inactive and later disbursed funds from the transaction while his 
license was suspended. The Court is further disturbed by Respondent's characterization of the 
suspension of his license as a mere "technicality" which would preclude his ability to close the 
transaction. Simply put, Respondent cavalierly continued to act as a broker without any regard for 
the fact his license was inactivated and later suspended. 
The Court duly acknowledges the Division has received no complaints of any misconduct 
undertaken by Respondent during the three years since his license was reinstated. Nevertheless, 
Respondent willingly disregarded those statutes which govern his licensure, particularly when 
partially influenced by the prospect of financial gain. The Court further finds and concludes 
Respondent lacks any genuine acknowledgement of-or significant remorse for-his misconduct To 
the contrary, Respondent has basically questioned the reluctance of the brokerage to close the 
transaction, minimized his role in Mr. Ojeda's attempt to improperly obtain the earnest money 
deposit and characterized his actions as well-intentioned efforts designed to merely promote the 
interests of the Ojedas and the Skankeys. The serious nature of Respondent's misconduct, coupled 
with his misguided and questionable attitude, compels the conclusion a severe sanction should be 
entered as to his license. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked. 
Dated this of July, 1994. 
linistrative Law Judge 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License 
of T. Morris Ostler to Practice as a 
Real Estate Broker 
ORDER 
RE90-10-01 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is 
hereby confirmed and adopted. The real estate broker license of T. Morris Ostler is hereby 
revoked, effective August 8, 1994. 
Dated this 0>+-U. day of July, 1994. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION: 
Dak-d Sirnims, Jr. (Ch 
udia E. Ashby (Vice Chair) / Cla i  
jd^Ts^^is 
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The above Order is confirmed and adopted by the undersigned this <? day of 
July, 1994. 
Steven H. StewaftTDirector 
Division of Real Estate 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
T. MORRIS OSTLER TO ACT AS A 
REAL ESTATE BROKER 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Case No. RE90-10-01 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency review filed by 
T. Morris Ostler ("Petitioner") following the revocation of his license to act as a real estate broker 
by the Real Estate Division ("Division"). The Division entered an order revoking Petitionees 
license on July 6, 1994, to become effective August 8, 1994. Petitioner originally requested 
reconsideration from the Division following entry of the revocation order, and the Attorney 
General!s office moved for dismissal of that request. The Division forwarded Petitioner's request 
for reconsideration to the executive director for treatment as a request for agency review 
Petitioner subsequently filed a timely request for agency review with the Department and 
requested oral argument. This matter is properly before me as a request for agency review; the 
request for oral argument is denied however, because the issues appear to be adequately 
developed in the pleadings filed herein. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R151-46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
Whether the Division, in revoking Petitioner's license, has property interpreted and applied 
the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions relating to Petitioner's conduct. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Division commenced this proceeding by filing a notice of agency action on 
Juiy 23, 1991. A hearing was conducted in this matter on April 18, 1994. On July 6, 1994, the 
Division adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Real Estate 
Commission ("Commission") following the April hearing and thereby revoked Petitioner real 
estate broker's license. Those Findings and Conclusions are adopted for purposes of this review 
In addition, Petitioner entered into a stipulation with the Division, by which he expressly admitted 
as true certain allegations made by the Division. 
2. In his request for agency review Petitioner contends that the sanction imposed is 
too severe under the circumstances. He cites, as mitigating against the sanction imposed, the fact 
that Petitioner readily admitted to the Division his error in closing the transaction that gave rise to 
the administrative action at a time when his license was inactive, that Petitioner's motivation 
regarding the transaction was the protection of the parties to the transaction, and that no 
complaints have been received by the Division regarding Petitioner since the petition was filed in 
1991. 
In place of the Division's order of revocation, Petitioner requests a three month suspension 
and a fine up to $1000, or as an alternative, suspension of the Division's order of revocation for 
some probationary period determined by the Commission. 
3. In response, the Division reasserts its position that the severity of the Petitioner's 
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misconduct mandates the revocation. It also states that at least one complaint against Petitioner 
has been received by the Division since the hearing. I note also that this is the second action 
against Petitioner's license . During 1990 and 1991, Petitioner's license had been suspended in 
Case No. RE89-06-10. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under Department Rule R151-^6b-13(3) the Division's order is stayed pending 
completion agency review. 
2. The conclusions of law adopted by the Division following the April hearing 
accurately apply the law to the facts in this case. Utah Code Subsection 61-2-11(6) states that the 
Division may revoke the license of a licensee if the licensee is found guilty of: 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies coming into his 
possession that belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting 
those funds from the purpose for which they were received; 
Petitioner admitted violating this provision by commingling funds he received after closing 
the Skanky-Ojeda transaction. In addition Petitioner admitted violating Utah Code Section 61-2-
1 (prohibiting unlicensed activity) in closing the Skanky-Ojeda transaction and accepting a sales 
commission while his license was inactive. 
The Commission made a finding regarding the most egregious conduct leading to 
Petitioner's license revocation, the dishonest dealing resulting from his inducement of Mr. Ojeda 
to request reimbursement of earnest money through dishonesty, in violation of Utah Code 
Subsection 61-2-11(17). While Petitioner urges cenain facts in mitigation of his conduct, none of 
them outweigh the gravity of this fact. I find that the Commission properly considered all facts 
mitigating in Petitioner's favor and all aggravating facts weighing against him. Consequently, the 
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revocation order was based on fact and entered according to law. The Division's order Is 
therefore upheld in its entirety. 
ORDER 
Consistent with the preceding analysis, the Division's revocation of Petitioner's license is 
upheld in its entirety. Consistent with Department Rule R15 l-46b-l3(5), the revocation of 
Petitioner's license is effective November 23, 1994. 
"9! 
Dated this W day of October 1994. 
Constance B. White, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for 
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I ceniiy that on the £ft day of October 1994, I caused to be mailed a true and correcr 
copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 North 100 East 
P.O Box 
Provo, Utah 34603-1266 
and caused a copy to be hand-deiivered to: 
Steven Stewart, Director 
Division of Real Estate 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
/ 
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